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Determinants of Collective Action under Devolution 







In 2001, a scheme called Citizen Community Board (CCB), a kind of 
community-based organisation (CBO), was introduced in Pakistan, under which local 
people propose development projects to the local government through forming a CCB, 
and upon approval the local government funds 80 percent of the project cost. Since 2001, 
however, both the number of CCBs and that of approved projects have been below the 
expected level. This raises a concern that the Pakistani society with limited historical 
experience in CBO-based development is too handicapped for the CCB scheme to be 
successful. This paper addresses this concern through quantifying the determinants of 
successful formation of a CCB and those of successful development activities conditional 
on the formation. The regression results using a cross-section dataset in a district in 
Pakistan Punjab in 2004-05 suggest that the rules within a CCB and the type of 
leadership are key to the success of CCB initiatives.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the theory of development economics, the role of community in economic 
development has been one of the focal issues [Hayami and Godo (2005)]. On the 
policy side as well, devolution initiatives with community as a key actor are currently 
undertaken in a number of developing countries to decentralise development planning 
and execution. The rationale behind the initiatives is the idea that decentralisation 
through community participation can contribute to efficiency, accountability, and 
transparency of poverty reduction policies through the utilisation of local information 
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and resources and through nurturing the sense of ownership [Bardhan (2002)]. 
However, as Bardhan and Mukherjee (2000, 2005) show theoretically, such initiatives 
may be vulnerable to the capture by local èlites. Whether the decentralisation and local 
participation improve the welfare of disadvantaged people thus becomes an empirical 
question. Bardhan and Mukherjee (2003) demonstrate that within-village targeting is 
more pro-poor than between- village targeting in West Bengal where supporters of the 
leftist government supervise resource allocation at the local level. Galasso and 
Ravallion (2005) show that within-village targeting to the poor improved in 
Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education programme, though they find some evidence of local 
capture. Yamauchi (2005) also finds that targeting performance improved after 
devolution in Indonesia when communities had high administrative capability. 
According to the survey by Mansuri and Rao (2004), the evidence on whether 
devolution improved targeting and public goods formation is mixed but tends to be 
positive under enabling institutional environment. At the same time, Mansuri and Rao 
(2004) point out the difficulty in establishing causality. 
Another strand of related literature is empirical studies on the determinants of 
collective action to manage common property resources [see Bandiera, et al. (2005) 
for a recent survey]. Among common property resources, the determinants of 
collective management of an irrigation system have been investigated by a number 
of authors [Wade (1988); Bardhan (2000); Dayton-Johnson (2000); Meinzen-Dick, 
et al. (2002)]. As far as the irrigation management is concerned, the impact of 
collective management on the efficiency of irrigation has also been investigated 
empirically [Sakurai and Palanisami (2001); Gragasin, et al. (2005); Kajisa (2005)]. 
These studies have shown that as determinants of collective action (especially in 
irrigation), focal variables include social heterogeneity, group size, asset inequality, 
and leadership. Most studies find that inequality and social heterogeneity are 
detrimental to successful collective action. The effects of group size or leadership 
depend on the empirical context.   
Combining the two strands of literature, we are left with unresolved questions 
such as (1) How do decentralisation and local participation improve the welfare of 
disadvantaged people under good local governance? Does the allocation by the 
leader matter (driven by changes in rules or by demand from below) or is the actual 
participation of the poor in the process of resource allocation important?
1 (2)  Are  the 
determinants of collective action found for irrigation management valid as the 
determinants of the participation by the poor when the governance rules are changed 
under devolution?   
This paper attempts to address these questions by investigating the determinants 
of collective action involved in development initiatives based on community-based 
organisations (CBO) under devolution. The case of concern is the Pakistani society 
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with limited historical experience in CBO-based cooperation in development. At the 
core of the Pakistan’s devolution initiatives lies a scheme called Citizen Community 
Board (CCB), a kind of CBO. Under the scheme, local people propose to the local 
government development projects through forming a CCB and upon approval the local 
government funds 80 percent of the project cost. Since 2001 when the scheme was 
initiated, however, both the number of CCBs and that of approved projects have been 
below the expected level. This paper thus investigates the determinants of formation of 
a CCB and those of successful development activities conditional on the formation. 
The whole process for villagers to form a CCB and then to prepare a project proposal is 
regarded as the collective action examined in this paper.   
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the background, 
introducing CCBs in Pakistan. Section 3 proposes the empirical model after a brief 
description of the dataset used in the empirical analysis.  Section 4 provides the 
estimation results, first for the determinants of formation of a CCB, and, second for 
the determinants of successful development activities conditional on the formation. 
The results show that outsider’s influence (such as NGO and local èlites) matters, 
more diverse CCBs are more likely to be successful, and the leadership type and the 
land inequality matter. Section 5 concludes the paper with the directions for further 
research and policy implications. 
 
2. DEVOLUTION AND CCB IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan is one of low income countries located in South Asia. Economic 
development in South Asia is characterised by a moderate success in economic 
growth with a substantial failure in human development such as basic health, 
education and gender equality [Dreze and Sen (1995)]. This characteristic is most 
apparent in Pakistan, as seen in country-level statistics reported by UNDP (2005): its 
GDP per capita is US$555 in nominal term and PPP$2097 in real term (the third 
place among the five major South Asian countries); life expectancy at birth for 
females is 63.2 years (the fourth place among the five South Asian countries); the 
combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools is 31 
percent (bottom among the five South Asian countries). Underlying this situation is a 
society with unequal distribution of income and assets where the core network is 
based on familial, clan, and tribal relations, with limited historical experience in 
CBO-based cooperation in development efforts [JICA (2003)]. 
The current government led by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, which came to power 
after a military coup in October 1999, has been attempting to change this situation 
through two policy measures. The first is the Devolution of Power [Cheema, et al. 
(2006)]. Under this policy, the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) was 
promulgated in August 2001 and the first local government elections were held 
according to LGO in the same month. The term of those elected representatives 
ended in 2005 and the second elections were held in the same year.   Takashi Kurosaki  256
The second policy measure is the Poverty Reduction Strategy based on the 
World Bank funded Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The Government of 
Pakistan prepared its Interim PRSP in November 2001 and the Full PRSPS in 
December 2003. There are four pillars in the Full PRSP: accelerating economic 
growth; improving governance and devolution; investing in human capital; and 
targeting the poor and the vulnerable [Pakistan (2003)]. Devolution is listed as one of 
these four pillars and thus closely linked with poverty reduction policies in Pakistan. 
Figure 1 shows the governance structure in Pakistan under the devolution 
initiatives. Devolution is designed in three spheres [GHK (2005); Cheema, et al. 
(2006)]. First, in the delivery of services and public goods by the government, the 
role of district bureaucracy has been enhanced in place of the provincial government, 
with the district government responsible for the service delivery in tehsils 
(sub-districts) and unions (smallest administrative units). Second, in the decision- 
making sphere, three-tier local bodies of elected representatives have been 
established, with District Nazim as the head of a district, Tehsil Nazim as the head of 
a tehsil, and Union Nazim as the head of a union. Third, in the financing sphere, 
direct budget allocations to districts and lower bodies have begun.   
 
Fig. 1. Governance Structure in Pakistan under “Devolution”. 
 
<Executive> <Legislature>
Federal Government National Assembly
Federal Government Provincial Assembly
District Government District Council
Tehsil Government Tehsil Council
Union Secretary Union Council  
Source: Prepared by the author using government information and GHK (2005). 
 
A union is the unit of local administration, monitored by a Union Council. It 
covers 5–20 villages/hamlets and a population of 10,000–25,000. A Union Council 
comprises 21 members elected by the local people, including four women’s seats, 
four peasant/worker households’ seats, two peasant/worker women’s seats, and one 
minority’s seat.
2   Union Nazim is the member of District Council. Union 
Naib-Nazim (sub-head of Union Council) is the member of Tehsil Council.   
 
2This corresponds to the situation prevailing during the survey period, March-April 2005. In 
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A Citizen Community Board (CCB) is a voluntary organisation based on the 
community in which people live. According to LGO, local people form a CCB with 
a chairman, a secretary, and general members. A registered CCB makes a proposal 
for development projects. The local government funds 80 percent of the total project 
cost. Since the promulgation of LGO in 2001, however, both the number of CCBs 
and the number of approved projects have been below the expected level [GHK 
(2005)]. Because a union is a too large unit for rural residents to organise collective 
action, the natural unit for villagers to initiate a CCB is a village. Therefore, the 
whole process for villagers to form a CCB and then to prepare a project proposal is 
regarded as the collective action examined below.   
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
3.1. Dataset 
To investigate the determinants of formation of a CCB and those of successful 
CCB development activities, primary datasets collected through the Devolution 
Support Project of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) are employed. 
The JICA project (2004–2006) is currently going on, focusing on preparing and 
implementing the CCB Improvement Plan in Hafizabad District, Punjab. 
Hafizabad is a small district on the bank of Chenab River. It has 42 
unions/towns and contains 428 villages/circles.
3 The district was separated from 
Gujranwala District in 1993. The landscape is very flat throughout the district and 
the majority of farmland is irrigated. The main monsoon crop is Basmati rice and the 
main winter crop is wheat, both of which are cultivated simultaneously with various 
fodder crops for livestock, mostly cows and buffaloes (Table 1). Although the land is 
suitable for intensive cultivation in most parts of the district, areas close to Chenab 
River are vulnerable to frequent flood and erosion. Hafizabad is known as a typical 
Punjab society dominated by a few big landlords and numerous owner-farmers, with 
substantial landless rural population [GHK (2005)]. Agricultural census data also 
show that land tenancy in Hafizabad is more frequently found than in other parts of 
Punjab (Table 1). 
As a benchmark survey, JICA implemented a socio-economic survey of 
Unions and CCBs in 2004-05 [RDPI (2005)]. Based on the benchmark survey results, 
the  Union Profile covering all of 42 unions in Hafizabad and the CCB Profile 
covering all of 119 CCBs registered so far have been compiled. From the Union 
Profile, village-level information for 428 villages is obtained. Since JICA’s CCB 
Improvement Plan in the field was initiated in October 2005, the datasets used in this 
paper show the situation before JICA’s intervention. 
 
3In urban areas, a town corresponds to a union (the smallest administrative unit) and a circle 
corresponds to a village. In the analysis below, a town or a union is called “union” and a village or a circle 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Agriculture in Hafizabad District, Pakistan (2000) 





Average size of private farms (acres)  7.2  5.3  9.1 
of which, cultivated area (acres)  6.6  5.0  8.7 
Composition of private farms by numbers     
Owner farms (%)  78.6  86.0  66.5 
Owner-cum-tenant farms (%)  11.0  8.5  14.1 
Tenant farms (%)  10.4  5.5  19.4 
Composition of private farms by farm areas     
Owner farms (%)  69.3  76.1  62.4 
Owner-cum-tenant farms (%)  19.5  17.3  22.7 
Tenant farms (%)  11.2  6.5  14.9 
Importance of large farms (25 acres+)       
In terms of farm numbers (%)  5.1  2.4  6.8 
In terms of farm acres (%)  31.1  18.1  31.3 
Importance of very large farms (150 acres+)       
In terms of farm numbers (%)  0.13  0.03  0.11 
In terms of farm acres (%)  4.16  1.16  2.59 
Farms with their land irrigated 100%     
In terms of farm numbers (%)  76.5  75.0  97.9 
In terms of farm acres (%)  66.9  77.5  92.5 
Cropping pattern: % of total cropped area       
Wheat  41 42 41 
Rice  11 35 38 
Cotton  15 0 0 
Sugarcane  3 2 1 
Fodder  Crops  13 13 16 
Vegetables  2 1 1 
Source: Pakistan (2001). 
Note:  Hafizabad District is one of the six districts included in Gujranwala Division. 
 
At the time when the survey was ended (March 2005), 119 CCBs were 
registered. Three unions had no CCB. Some unions had more than one CCB. 
Twenty-five CCB projects were approved and only three schemes received funds. 
Total accumulated CCB fund in Hafizabad was Rs 121.8 m (approx. US$ 2.5m).   
Figure 2 shows the current status of 119 CCBs. Seven of them already 
disappeared and no information was obtained. From the remaining 112 CCBs, 77 
drafted a project proposal and 58 submitted the proposal to the local government by 
the time of the survey. Major activities of the existing CCBs are listed in Table 2. 
Five areas stand by, with no single dominating activity: agriculture-related activities 
(items 1 and 2), rural infrastructure (items 3 and 4), health (item 5), education  (items 
6 and 7), and religious facilities (item 9). Those CCBs interested in micro credit 
(item 8) are mostly focusing on agricultural production loans so that this item is also 
related with agriculture. The CCBs with non-specified activities (items 10 and 11) 
are more likely to fail in preparing project proposals. Collective Action under Devolution Initiatives  259
Fig. 2. Status of CCBs in March/April 2005. 
 
Total Registered    119 
 
 
Existing? Yes  112  No  7 
 
 
Project Proposal Drafted?  Yes  77  No  35 
 
 
Project Proposal Submitted?  Yes  58  No  19 
 
Source: Prepared by the author using the JICA database (the same for the following tables). 
 
Table 2 
Major Activities of the Existing CCBs in Hafizabad 







    Nos (%) Nos (%) Nos (%) 
  (1)  Irrigation  3 (2.7) 3 (3.9)  3 (5.2) 
 (2) Agro centre for fertiliser and seed supply  13  (11.7)  13  (16.9)  11  (19.0) 
 (3) Roads and bridge construction  17  (15.3)  15  (19.5)  11  (19.0) 
 (4) Sewage, drainage, and gas pipeline  14  (12.6)  13  (16.9)  10  (17.2) 
 (5) Health facilities  19  (17.1)  19  (24.7)  16  (27.6) 
 (6) General education facilities  12  (10.8)  10  (13.0)  7  (12.1) 
 (7) Vocational training centre  13  (11.7)  12  (15.6)  9  (15.5) 
 (8) Micro credit  6  (5.4)  5  (6.5)  5  (8.6) 
 (9) Religious (prayer hall, graveyard wall, etc.)  17  (15.3)  16  (20.8)  10  (17.2) 
(10) Non-specified “development”  20  (18.0)  3  (3.9)  1  (1.7) 
(11)  Activities  unknown  11 (9.9) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 
Number of CCBs  111     77     58    
Notes: (1) The number of observations for “All existing CCBs” is 111 due to one observation with very 
incomplete information. 
(2) Multiple responses were allowed so that the sum of the percentages (in parenthesis) exceeds 
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3.2. Empirical Models 
Villagers organise collective action to form a CCB when their expected 
benefit from CCB registration is greater than its costs. Benefits and costs of such 
collective action depend on the village and union characteristics such as economic 
and political activities, infrastructure, and leadership [Meinzen-Dick, et al. (2002)]. 
Thus, the determinants of successful formation of a CCB are analysed by a 
village-level regression model: 
Prob(Yi =1) = f(Xkb1 + Xib2 + ui),  … … … …  (1) 
where Yi is the dummy variable for village i to have a CCB, Xk is a vector of the 
characteristics of union k to which village i belongs, Xi is a vector of the village 
characteristics, b1 and b2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated, ui is a zero-mean 
error term, and f(.) is a probit, logit, or linear function. 
Once a CCB is formed, CCB members organise collective action to prepare a 
CCB project draft. To prepare the draft successfully, the members need to coordinate 
potentially conflicting interests among them and to satisfy technical specifications 
required from the local government as an acceptable proposal for fund allocation. 
Therefore, the success of such collective action can be modelled by a CCB-level 
regression model: 
Prob(Yj =1) = f(Xkb1 + Xib2 + Xjb3 + uj),  … … …  (2) 
where Yj is the dummy variable for CCB j to organise collective action successfully 
(proposal drafted or submitted), Xj is a vector of the CCB characteristics (inequality, 
group size, heterogeneity, leadership, CCB rules, etc.). Empirical variables are 
summarised in Table 3. 
Vectors of variables Xi and Xk are included in both Equations (1) and (2). If 
the dependent variables Yi (CCB formation) and Yj (CCB proposal preparation) 
capture the same collective action, we expect Xi and Xk to have coefficients with 
same signs across Equations (1) and (2). Instead, if the coefficients are different 
substantially, it is suggested that Yi and Yj capture different types of collective action. 
In this context, it should be noted that Yj implies the commitment of the local people 
to pay 20 percent of the project cost. In theory, villagers can register a CCB without 
such commitment (or without any cooperation as an extreme case if a leader is able 
to collect a sufficient number of signatures required for CCB registration). This is 
like purchasing an option for CCB project proposals in the future, since there is no 
penalty on inactive CCBs. In contrast, once a project proposal is prepared and 
submitted to the local government, CCB members are required to bear 20 percent of 
the project cost. We therefore expect that more corporation among villagers is required 
for the dependent variable Yj to be unity. In this sense, the project preparation may be a 
better proxy for collective action than the CCB formation. It is then an empirical 
question how the coefficients on Xi and Xk differ across Equations (1) and (2).   Collective Action under Devolution Initiatives  261
Table 3 
Definition and Summary Statistics of Empirical Variables for CCB Analysis 
Name Definition  Mean  Std. Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
Union-level Variables (NOB=42)         
popden  Population density in Union (nos/acre) 3.142  3.944  0.623  17.071 
d_rural  Dummy for unions not belonging to a city “circle” 
with incomplete acreage data* 
0.833 0.377  0  1 
litrate  Adult literacy rates (%)  41.4  12.5  22.3  72.2 
schlden  Number of schools per 1000 persons 1.353  0.360  0.799  2.341 
d_schl  Dummy for unions not belonging to a city “circle” 
with incomplete school data* 
0.810 0.397  0  1 
Lhwden  Number of lady health workers per 1000 persons  1.353 0.858  0.272  4.218 
h_water  Ratio of households with tap water  0.086  0.114 0.005  0.597 
d_bank  Distance to the nearest bank branch (km)  6.143  5.449  0  20 
d_po  Distance to the nearest post office (km)  1.000  1.835  0  8 
ucmeet  Number of UC meetings held so far  5.357  4.047  0  20 
ngo  Number of NGOs registered  1.143  1.280  0  5 
Village-level Variables (NOB=406)#        
d_ccb  Dummy for having a CCB (dependent var.)  0.207  0.406  0  1 
popv_t  Population of the village (1000)  1.945  2.580  0.055  17.972 
fmrate  Female population/male population 0.921  0.064  0.670  1.172 
popv_mn  Minorities population/total population 0.011  0.029  0  0.322 
infl  Number of influential persons in the village  0.347  0.734  0  4 
CCB-level Variables (NOB=111)        
d_pdft  Dummy for preparing a project proposal draft 
(dependent var.) 
0.685 0.467  0  1 
d_subm  Dummy for submitting a finalised project proposal 
(dependent var.) 
0.514 0.502  0  1 
ccb_age  Weeks since CCB registration  69.124  21.168  28  109 
num_mem  Number of CCB members  25.532  1.808  20  38 
womenr  Ratio of female CCB members  0.140  0.255  0  1.000 
d_meet  Dummy for the regular meeting  0.748  0.436  0  1 
n_occp  Number of occupations among members  4.788  1.939  1  12 
ineq_ed  Inequality in CCB members’ education (max 
schooling years–min schooling years) 
12.231 2.256  6  16 
ineq_ld  Inequality in CCB members’ landholding (max 
acreage–min acreage) in 10 acres 
2.793 2.959  0  25 
lead_sex  Chairman’s sex dummy (=1 if female)  0.135  0.343  0  1 
lead_age  Chairman’s age (years)  39.570  10.903  20  70 
lead_edy  Chairman’s schooling years  10.808  2.697  0  16 
lead_lnd  Chairman’s landholding in 10 acres  1.345  2.577  0  25 
miss_gen  Dummy for the incomplete CCB records  0.324  0.470  0  1 
Notes: # NOB is 406 after deleting marginal villages with population less than 50.  
      *When the acreage data or the number of schools are incomplete within a union, the information on the part with 
available data is extrapolated to other parts. 
 
4. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
4.1. Determinants of CCB Formation   
The estimation results of Equation (1) with function f(.) specified as the 
cumulative distribution function for a standard normal variable (i.e., a probit 
specification) are reported in the first two columns of Table 4. Among the village- 
and union-level variables except for those controlling for data quality (d_rural, 
d_schl), there are six variables with statistical significance (popv_t,  infl,  litrate, 
schlden, d_bank, ngo).  Takashi Kurosaki  262
Table 4 
Determinants of CCB Formation in a Village 





Linear Probability Model 
with Union Fixed Effects 
   dF/dX  (Std. Error)  dF/dX  (Std. Error)  Coef  (Std. Error) 
Village-level Variables       
popv_t  0.067*** (0.018) 0.059*** (0.017)  0.075***  (0.011) 
fmrate  –0.128 (0.285)      –0.189  (0.241) 
popv_mn  –0.434 (0.659)      –0.432  (0.637) 
infl  0.059* (0.031)  0.059*  (0.031)  0.066*  (0.040) 
Union-level Variables         
popden  –0.014 (0.019)     
d_rural  0.044 (0.131)     
litrate  0.009*** (0.003) 0.004*  (0.002) 
schlden  –0.174** (0.087)  –0.151*  (0.082) 
d_schl  –0.590* (0.278)  –0.341  (0.320) 
lhwden  –0.103 (0.063)     
h_water  –0.135 (0.579)     
d_bank  0.020*** (0.006) 0.016*** (0.005) 
d_po  –0.017 (0.013)     
Union fixed effects are 
jointly significant at the 
1% level. 
ucmeet  0.0002 (0.007)         
ngo  0.049** (0.027)  0.057**  (0.025)     
Log Likelihood [R2]  –141.7986     –144.8081     [0.3493] 
Chi2-stat [F] for zero slope  77.68 ***    70.68 ***   [5.59] *** 
Note:  The number of observation is 406. (2) The dependent variable is d_ccb (see Table 3).  (3) Standard 
errors were Huber-White heteroscedastic robust ones (statistically significant at 1 percent***, 5 
percent**, and 10 percent*). (4) “dF/dX” shows the marginal effect of the explanatory variable on the 
probability, evaluated at sample means (continuous variables), or the effect of the dummy 
explanatory variable on the probability when the dummy is increased from zero to one. 
 
First, the village population (popv_t) is associated with CCB formation 
positively: an increase of the village population by one thousand raises the 
probability of CCB formation by 6.7 percent.  This can be interpreted as a scale 
effect, not as a density effect, since the population density is also included in the 
model (insignificant). A related finding is the positive coefficient on the population’s 
literacy rate (litrate): an increase of the union’s adult literacy rate by one percentage 
points increases the probability of CCB formation by 0.9 percent. Thus the large size 
of literate population favours CCB formation.   
Second, leadership matters at the stage of CCB formation, as suggested by 
positive and significant coefficients on infl (the number of influential persons in the 
village) and on ngo (the number of NGOs in the union). With one more influential 
person in the village, the probability of CCB formation increases by 5.9 percent, and 
with one more NGO working in the union, the probability of CCB formation 
increases by 4.9 percent. This confirms our field observations that NGOs               
are encouraging CCB formation at the grass root level and villagers turn to local 
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persons in the village, people listed landlords, village heads, teachers, social workers, 
religious leaders, etc. Interestingly, the types of the influential persons did not yield a 
statistically significant difference. Furthermore, ucmeet (the cumulative number of 
Union Council [UC] meetings) is not significant at all. If UCs are effective in 
encouraging villagers to form a CCB, we expect the coefficient on ucmeet to be 
positive. The regression results does not support this, implying that the number of 
UC meeting is not related with CCB promotion.
4 
The factors discussed so far are determinants of the supply side of collective 
action in CCB formation. The demand side, i.e., the variables determining people’s 
needs, has to be controlled for. Therefore, indicators for service delivery are included 
such as the number of schools, health workers, housing facilities, and the distance to 
banks and post offices. Among these variables, those with statistical significance 
have expected signs: villages in a union with fewer schools (schlden) and more 
difficulty in bank access (d_bank) are more likely to form a CCB.
5  
The results based on a logit specification
6  are very similar to those reported in 
Table 4. When insignificant explanatory variables are deleted from the regression, 
the size and statistical significance of the six variables (popv_t, infl, litrate, schlden, 
d_bank, ngo) remain stable (see “parsimonious specification” in Table 4). To control 
for the omitted variable bias at the union level, a linear probability model with union 
fixed effects is estimated (the last columns of Table 4). The effects of the four 
village-level variables on CCB formation are very similar to those estimated by a 
probit model. Our results on the determinants of CCB formation are therefore highly 
robust. 
 
4.2.    Determinants of the Successful Preparation   
     of  a  CCB  Project  Proposal  
Once a CCB is formed, the next step is to prepare a proposal for CCB projects. 
Under what conditions, CCB members are successful in coordinating collective action 
that results in an acceptable project proposal? Estimation results based on Equation (2) 
with function f(.) specified as a probit are reported in Table 5. Before discussing the 
results, two remarks are given. First, as a robustness check, we choose two dependent 
variables: a dummy for the preparation of a project proposal draft and a dummy for the   
 
4Or, the reverse causality may exist here: if more UC meetings on the subject of CCB promotion 
are held in a union with more difficulty in CCB formation, ucmeet and d_ccb may be negatively correlated. 
This possibility can be checked by investigating minute books of UC meetings, which is left for further 
research. 
5It is possible that d_bank may capture the extent of commercialisation of the Union. In the 
literature on collective action (see Section 1), many authors have found that the extent of 
commercialisation is detrimental to cooperation. The positive effect of d_bank is consistent with this 
interpretation as well.   
6The function f(z) = e
z/(1+ e
z), where e is the base of natural logarithms, equal to approximately 
2.7183. Table 5 
Determinants of the Preparation of a Project Proposal Conditional on CCB Formation (Probit Regression Results) 
   “d_ pdft” (Dummy for the Preparation of Project Proposal Draft)  “d_subm” (Dummy for the Submission of Project Proposal) 
   dF/dX  (Std.Error)  dF/dX  (Std. Error)  dF/dX  (Std. Error)  dF/dX  (Std. Error) 
CCB-level Variables              
ccb_age  0.004** (0.002)  0.003  (0.002)  0.007**   (0.003)  0.007**  (0.003) 
num_mem  0.023 (0.022)  0.024 (0.023)  –0.116* (0.060)  –0.113*  (0.060) 
womenr  (omitted due to m.c. with lead_sex)  –0.115  (0.206)  (omitted due to m.c. with lead_sex) –0.194  (0.240) 
d_meet  0.753*** (0.099)  0.579*** (0.114)  0.627*** (0.076)  0.619***  (0.079) 
n_occp  0.046** (0.024)  0.075** (0.027)  –0.026 (0.030)  –0.027  (0.032) 
ineq_ed  0.017 (0.023) –0.010 (0.030)  0.001 (0.028)  0.004  (0.029) 
ineq_ld  0.005  (0.018)  (omitted due to m.c. with lead_lnd)  –0.040**  (0.020)  (omitted due to m.c. with lead_lnd) 
lead_sex  –0.032  (0.151)  (omitted due to m.c. with womenr)  –0.128  (0.185)  (omitted due to m.c. with womenr) 
lead_age  0.014** (0.006)  0.007  (0.005)  0.006 (0.006)  0.004  (0.006) 
lead_edy  0.002 (0.017)  0.003 (0.018)  –0.004 (0.021)  0.000  (0.021) 
lead_lnd  (omitted due to m.c. with ineq_ld)  0.081*  (0.045)  (omitted due to m.c. with ineq_ld) –0.034*  (0.020) 
miss_gen  –0.353*** (0.115)  –0.420*** (0.099)  –0.161 (0.124)  –0.158  (0.124) 
Village-level Variables            
popv_t  0.013 (0.012)  0.011 (0.011)  –0.034* (0.019)  –0.029  (0.019) 
infl  (omitted due to “perfect prediction”)  (omitted due to “perfect prediction”) 0.030  (0.073)  0.026  (0.074) 
Union-level Variables            
litrate  0.019***  (0.006)  (omitted due to “perfect prediction”) 0.029***  (0.009)  0.029***  (0.009) 
schlden  0.015 (0.172) –0.049 (0.157)  0.265 (0.210)  0.267  (0.205) 
d_bank  0.034*** (0.013)  0.003  (0.013)  0.028* (0.017) 0.029*  (0.018) 
ngo  0.042 (0.051)  0.027 (0.053)  0.154** (0.065)  0.142**  (0.065) 
Log Likelihood  –31.237     –34.950     –47.463     –48.107 
Chi2-stat for zero slope  121.14 ***     77.12 ***     40.49 ***     40.49 *** 
Notes:  (1) The number of observations is 111 (see Table 3).  (2) Expression “m.c.” in “omitted due to m.c. with xxx” is short for “multicollinearity”.  (3) and (4) see Table 4. Collective Action under Devolution Initiatives  265
submission of the proposal. As shown in Figure 2, submission is conditional on the 
draft preparation. In this sense, it may be desirable to estimate a model of sequential 
decision-making. As the first step to approach the desirable model, Equation (2) is 
estimated for each of these dependent variables with the same explanatory variables. In 
other words, a completely reduced-form approach is adopted. Second, since the 
number of observations is rather small, the degree of freedom is low, which makes the 
estimation of (2) vulnerable to multicollinearity problems. Among the CCB-level 
explanatory variables listed in Table 3, two pairs have very high correlation 
coefficients (more than 0.8). One is correlation between womenr (the ratio of female 
CCB members) and lead_sex (a dummy for a female chairman) and the other is 
correlation between ineq_ld (inequality in CCB members’ landholding) and lead_lnd 
(chairman’s landholding). This is natural in the environment in the study area where a 
CCB chairman represents the upper stratum of CCB members. To avoid the 
multicollinearity problems due to the high correlation of these variables, only one each 
from the two pairs is included in the estimated model. This is the limit of the current 
dataset. With more degrees of freedom, effects of ineq_ld (through inequality) and 
lead_lnd (through leadership) could have been estimated simultaneously. A         
related problem is that we cannot include a full set of village- and union-level variables 
because the inclusion leads to the “perfect prediction” of the dependent variable for a 
number of observations. Therefore, we limit the number of village- and union-level 
variables among those significant in Table 4 and drop some of the variables when they 
are responsible for the perfect prediction. 
The estimation results show that among the village- and union-level variables 
retained, those with statistical significance have the same sign as in Table 4. 
Residents’ literacy (litrate) and the union’s disadvantage in the access to banks 
(d_bank) both increase the probability of successful preparation and submission of a 
CCB project proposal. The presence of NGO (ngo) increases the probability but the 
effect is statistically significant only at the stage of proposal submission. Union-level 
variables are mostly insignificant. 
Among CCB-level variables, several variables have coefficients that are 
congruent across specifications. First, the collective action for project finalisation 
takes time: ccb_age has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant in 
three out of the four specifications in Table 5. An increase of CCB age by one week 
raises the probability of CCB project submission by 0.7 percent.   
Second, CCB’s management and rules matter. Those CCBs holding a meeting 
regularly (d_meet) are more likely to prepare a draft and to submit the proposal (the 
probability of proposal submission increases by more than 60 percent); those CCBs 
not recording their activities properly (miss_gen) are less likely to prepare a draft 
(the probability decreases by 35 or by 42 percent) and to submit the proposal (the 
probability decreases by 16 percent), though the latter effect on the submission was 
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Third, the group size (num_mem) and the number of occupations among 
members (n_occp) have positive coefficients on proposal preparation and negative 
coefficients on proposal submission. Among them, the positive effect of n_occp on 
the preparation and the negative effect of num_mem on the submission are 
statistically significant. The negative effect of the member size is consistent with 
the findings in the majority of studies on collective action in irrigation 
management [Bandiera, et al. (2005); Wade (1988); Bardhan (2000); 
Dayton-Johnson (2000)]. Positive and significant effects of n_occp (the number of 
occupations among members) on the preparation of project proposals are against 
the findings in the literature that the social heterogeneity among members is 
detrimental to collective action [Wade (1988); Bardhan (2000); Dayton-Johnson 
(2000)]. The regression result seems to suggest that the superiority in technical 
skills of more heterogeneous CCBs surpasses the disadvantage of such CCBs in 
terms of maintaining cooperation. In this sense, the regression result shows the 
lack of technical support from the CCB administration in preparing project 
proposals. However, at the stage of proposal submission, n_occp has a negative 
and insignificant effect on collective action, suggesting a possibility that the ill 
effect of n_occp appear at this stage that requires more coordination among CCB 
members because the submission of the proposal implies the official commitment 
of local people to pay 20 percent of the project cost. 
Inequality in land holding among CCB members (ineq_ld) seems detrimental 
to the submission of the proposal although its effect is only marginally significant in 
the statistical sense. It may also capture the effects of the leadership through land 
holding (lead_lnd). The coefficient on lead_lnd is positive on d_pdft but negative on 
d_subm, both of which are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The effect 
of  ineq_ld on d_pdft is also positive, though not statistically significant. This 
suggests a possibility that the effect of land inequality on collective action may differ 
depending on the stage of project preparation. This requires further research since the 
results here are weak and mixed. 
Unexpectedly, all of CCB-level variables related with education and gender 
are insignificant in all specifications. The coefficients on education variables 
(leader’s education as well as member’s inequality in education) have large standard 
errors. The coefficients on womenr (the ratio of female CCB members) and lead_sex 
(a dummy for a female chairman) are negative, indicating that a CCB with more 
female presence is disadvantaged in preparing projects. This is as expected in the 
context of Pakistan. However, these effects are far from statistically significant. The 
marginal effects estimated are very small. Therefore, these results show that the 
disadvantage of female-dominated CCBs is not discernible, which is a good sign. 
The results based on a logit specification are very similar to those reported in 
Table 5. The deletion of insignificant explanatory variables from the regression does 
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village-level variables are not so robust, however, depending on which of these 
semi-macro variables are retained. Nevertheless, changing the union- and 
village-level variables does not change the size and signs of CCB-level variables 
with statistical significance reported in Table 5.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper estimated the determinants of collective action among Pakistani 
villagers using a cross-section micro dataset. The determinants of successful 
formation of a CCB (a kind of community based organisation promoted by the 
government) were estimated using a village-level probit model. The results showed 
that villages with more literate population are more likely to form a CCB, the 
presence of NGOs in the union and influential persons in the village raises the 
probability of CCB formation, and villages with less access to schools and financial 
institutions are more likely to be successful in forming a CCB. The determinants of 
successful preparation of CCB development projects conditional on the CCB 
formation were estimated using a CCB-level probit model. The results showed that 
older CCBs, CCBs with more strict management (regular meetings and 
record-keeping), CCBs with more technical skills (diversity in members’ occupation) 
are more likely to prepare a project proposal draft and to submit the proposal to the 
local government. The effects of education, gender, and inequality on the project 
success probability were not clearly discernible, although a negative effect of land 
inequality on project submission was found. This study thus seems to show that 
CCB-based collective action is possible even in the Pakistani society where the core 
network is not based on local residential areas, under the condition with favourable 
factors found in the regression analysis.   
One caveat of these findings is that interpreting them as showing the 
mechanism of collective action through CCB may not be warranted for several 
reasons. First, the causality may be opposite for several variables. For example, 
regular CCB meeting could be a result of active preparatory work for a CCB project. 
Second, CCBs are formed endogenously so that group size, number of occupations 
among members, leader’s characteristics, etc. are the results of endogenous matching, 
and, record keeping and regular meetings are the results of endogenous formation of 
CCB rules. To elicit the true causal effects of these CCB characteristics on CCB 
performance, we need exogenous variation, which is lacking in the current dataset. 
Third, the regression results reported in this paper may be subject to the omitted 
variable bias. For example, within-village inequality among non-CCB members (but 
potential beneficiaries of a CCB project) may be a factor in determining the success 
of the CCB project. For these reasons, the regression results reported in this paper 
are only suggestive. 
Despite the caveat, we can extract from these regression results several lessons 
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influential people more closely. On the other hand, when administration itself targets at 
unions and villages directly, those without NGOs should be given high priority. Second, 
support to female-dominated CCBs is required and will be effective, considering the 
regression result that some female-dominated CCBs are successful, indicating that 
female-dominated CCBs are feasible under favourable conditions. Third, the inside 
management of a CCB has to be monitored rigorously. Holding a CCB meeting 
regularly and keeping activity records properly are an effective way to create more 
successful CCBs. Fourth, technical support to CCBs in preparing project proposals is 
required, considering the regression result that the occupational heterogeneity within 
CCBs is associated with more success in CCB project preparation. Since the 
occupational heterogeneity is usually detrimental to collective action, the regression 
result seems to suggest that the superiority in technical skills of more heterogeneous 
CCBs surpasses the disadvantage of such CCBs in terms of maintaining cooperation. 
Therefore, technical support in preparing project proposals should be provided with 
more efficiency from the CCB administration.   
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